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Abstract:  
With resurgent interest in individual differences in perception, cognition and behavioural 
control, as early indicators of disease, endophenotypes, or a means to relate brain structure 
to function, behavioural tasks are increasingly being transferred from within-subject settings 
to between-group or correlational designs. The assumption is that where we know the 
mechanisms underlying within-subject effects, these effects can be used to measure 
individual differences in those same mechanisms. However, between-subject variability can 
arise from an entirely different source from that driving within-subject effects, and here we 
report a clear-cut demonstration of this. We examined the debated relationship between the 
visibility of a masked-prime stimulus and the direction of priming it causes (positive or 
reversed). Such reversal of priming has been hypothesized to reflect an automatic inhibitory 
mechanism that controls partially activated responses and allows behavioural flexibility. 
Within subjects, we found an unambiguous systematic transition from reversed priming to 
positive priming as prime visibility increased, replicated seven times, and using different 
stimulus manipulations. However, across individuals there was never a relationship between 
prime discrimination ability and priming. Specifically, these data resolve the controversial 
debate on visibility and reversed priming, indicating that they arise from independent 
processes relying on partially shared stimulus signals. More generally, they stand as an 
exemplar case in which variance between individuals arises from a different source from that 
produced by stimulus manipulations. 
1. Introduction 
 
Psychology has always contained within in it a division between two approaches (e.g. 
Hull, 1945; Cronbach, 1957). One seeks to assesses and explain differences between 
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individuals, normally via correlational methods, while the other investigates basic 
cognitive processes with experiments that treat individual differences as nuisance 
variation. Cronbach (1957) hoped that 'the two disciplines of psychology' would 
converge and integrate because, he argued, 'kept independent, they can give only wrong 
answers or no answers at all regarding certain important problems' (p. 673).  
It is likely that Cronbach would be disappointed with the degree of integration achieved 
more than 50 years later, but a new impetus for integration is now being driven from a 
direction that Cronbach might not have anticipated - psychological medicine, imaging 
and genetics, where there is increasing use of behavioural tasks from experimental 
psychology to measure individual differences in perception, cognition and behavioural 
control. To take three examples, there is the hope in psychiatric genetics of finding 
cognitive ‘endophenotypes’ – heritable and stable differences in cognitive mechanisms 
associated with psychiatric illness (Gottesman & Gould, 2003); there is growing 
endeavour in brain imaging to relate individual differences in structure, such as white 
matter connectivity, to differences in function; and there is accelerating interest in ageing, 
which is most easily studied cross-sectionally rather than longitudinally.  
The problem for integration. 
In these examples, it appears to be commonly assumed that where a task has been used 
successfully to reveal and investigate specific cognitive mechanisms through specific 
manipulations of stimuli or conditions, that task can then be simply used to measure how 
people differ in those mechanisms. In other words, that established within-subject 
phenomena will have easily-interpreted translation to individual differences. 
Unfortunately this is not true. Variance between individuals can arise from an entirely 
different source from that driving, and therefore studied using, within-subject effects 
(e.g. Borsboom, Kievit, Cervone & Hood, 2009). As we will show below, this can 
happen not just for complex individual differences such as IQ or personality, but even 
when a task is supposed to tap a much more basic mechanism, where it is intuitive to 
assume that individual differences would come from that same basic mechanism.  
The theoretical basis for the difficulty in integrating correlational and experimental 
approaches is that, 'barring perhaps the most basic laboratory tasks for which 
assumptions like ergodicity or measurement invariance over individuals might be taken 
to hold true, any theory on intra-individual processes is compatible with any theory of 
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inter-individual differences' (Borsboom, Kievit, Cervone & Hood, 2009, p 19). In other 
words, without additional simplifying assumptions, it is not possible to infer anything 
about within-person dependence from between-person comparisons, and vice versa. 
This problem is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows four hypothetical examples of how 
within-subject variance may or may not align with between-subject variance. 
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the theoretical independence of within- and between-
subject variance through four examples. A) Within each individual (different gray tones), 
measurements 1 and 2 covary positively with each other, while individuals’ means (white 
diamonds) covary negatively across the sample. This situation may appear counter-intuitive, 
but we are familiar with it in many circumstances with bidirectional causality: e.g. clothing 
thickness will correlate positively with feelings of warmth if clothing is manipulated within 
individuals; but across individuals, people who on average feel colder are likely to put thicker 
clothes on. B) Within each individual, measurements 1 and 2 are positively correlated, and 
individual’s means also covary positively across the sample, as intuitively expected in many 
situations C) Within each individual, measurements 1 and 2 are not correlated, but 
individual’s means covary positively across the sample. D) Within each individual, 
measurements 1 and 2 are correlated (positively in this example), but the means do not 
covary across the sample.  
 
Multiply-determined traits vs. basic mechanisms 
Counterintuitive relationships like those depicted in Figure 1 do not require that the 
sources of individual differences are entirely independent from those driving within-
subject effects. They might still arise if there are too many potential interacting 
mechanisms contributing to individual variability, but only some of which have been 
exploited and understood through experimental manipulations (Borsboom, Kievit, 
Cervone & Hood, 2009). This problem of relating multiply determined individual 
differences to within-subject experimental manipulations has been most commonly 
discussed with regard to multifactorial traits such as personality and IQ (Cronbach, 1957;  
Borsboom, Kievit, Cervone & Hood, 2009). However as alluded to in Borsboom et al.'s 
quote (“barring perhaps the most basic laboratory tasks”) the simpler the behaviour, the 
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more likely it is to be strongly associated with one particular cognitive mechanism. In this 
case, it might be true that individual differences in task performance reflect the same 
underlying mechanism as studied in the experimental literature.   
Historically, Hull (1945) expressed a related view when he argued that there are common 
laws governing behaviour across individuals and even species. If an experimentally 
derived behavioural 'law' or equation - for example, relating stimulus strength to 
behavioural outcome - has variables (such as stimulus strength) and 'constants', then Hull 
argued that while experimentalists manipulate the 'variables' it is in the 'constant' 
parameters that individuals and species will differ. Those parameters would represent 
'primary' individual differences, which then combine and interact to produce the 
'secondary' differences measured in overt behaviour. It would be almost impossible to 
derive these 'laws' (i.e. understand basic cognitive mechanisms and derive functional 
models) from only studying individual differences. However, if you already know the 
laws/mechanisms from experimentation, and have tasks that can specify the parameters 
for different individuals, then you could understand individual differences with respect to 
these mechanisms.  
This, as we perceive it, is the basic hope and implicit assumption of the various ventures 
to use individual differences in well-known cognitive tasks to relate brain structure, 
clinical symptoms, or genetic variation to basic cognitive mechanisms. However, we are 
aware of no explicit investigation of whether this implicit assumption holds even for 
tasks that are considered to tap the most basic mechanisms. It is possible that individual 
variance still arises from a combination of sources, and that the main variability is 
independent from the mechanisms that are experimentally manipulated. Here, we focus 
on the relationship between the visibility of a prime stimulus and the effect it has on 
motor control.  
The case of visibility and motor priming 
It has become widely accepted that our ‘voluntary’ purposeful actions should rather be 
regarded as an interaction between processes occurring within and without the scope of 
conscious awareness (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; Boy, Husain, & Sumner, 
2010; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). An important and perennial question arises from this 
framework: what is the relationship, if any, between our conscious awareness of a 
stimulus and the way in which that stimulus influences motor plans? A practical way to 
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investigate non-conscious motor influences has been implemented in the masked 
priming paradigm (e.g. Leuthold & Kopp, 1998). Generally, prime stimuli speed 
responses to subsequent “target” stimuli if they are associated with the same response 
(compatible) and slow responses if prime and target are associated with different 
responses (incompatible). This positive compatibility effect (PCE) has been taken to 
demonstrate that a prime can partially activate the response associated with it, even 
though the participant had no intention of responding to the prime and may not even 
have perceived it (note that for priming to occur, the participant must be intending to 
respond to the target).  
In some masked priming paradigms, a counterintuitive negative compatibility effect 
(NCE) has been measured, such that responses are faster and more accurate for 
incompatible primes than for compatible primes (for reviews, see Eimer & Schlaghecken, 
2003; Sumner, 2007). Most interestingly for the present purpose, in the initial studies of 
the NCE, the direction of priming appeared to depend on whether the prime was above 
or below perceptual discrimination threshold: visible primes produced PCEs while 
invisible primes produced NCEs (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002). 
There are theoretical reasons to expect a strong relationship between prime visibility 
and priming effects. Firstly, the original theory of the NCE (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 
1998, 2002, 2003), proposed that the very role of the inhibitory mechanism indexed by 
the NCE was to suppress weak motor activation evoked by previously learnt stimulus-
response associations, unless the stimulus reached conscious awareness. Presumably 
stimuli that reach awareness are more likely to be behaviourally relevant than those that 
do not, and so it might be efficient to allow positive motor priming by stimuli we are 
conscious of, but to suppress it when we are not conscious of its source.  
More generally, even if there were not any causal connection between visibility and 
the priming effect, we would expect a strong relationship if the same cascaded visual 
processing underlies both. We assume that some visual information gets through to 
motor areas regardless of whether it has reached conscious threshold – this is what 
causes subliminal motor priming – and we also assume that as the representation 
strength of visual information increases, then it is more likely to be consciously 
perceived. If we further suppose, not unreasonably, that increases in representation 
strength will also have a systematic effect on priming, then we predict there would 
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generally be a strong correlation between priming and visibility even without any direct 
causal connection between them.  
 
Perception separate from action? 
Alternative to the above theoretical frameworks are proposals that pathways 
subserving non-conscious processes are distinct from those serving conscious awareness, 
or, relatedly, that pathways linking vision to action are distinct from those leading to 
perceptual experience (Milner & Goodale, 1995). It is also possible that differences in 
temporal dynamics, rather than simply anatomical pathway, constitute an important 
distinction between information driving priming and information supporting conscious 
perception. For example, priming may be mainly driven by an initial transient forward 
sweep of information, while awareness is supported by subsequent sustained recurrent 
processing (Bompas & Sumner, 2008; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). These ‘dissociation’ 
accounts do not require a correlation between visibility and priming.  
As mentioned above, for the NCE paradigm, a strong relationship between visibility 
and the direction of priming was initially reported: invisible primes produced NCEs 
while visible primes produced PCEs (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; Klapp & Hinkley, 
2002). However, this relationship soon became controversial: NCEs were also found to 
occur when prime discrimination was above chance (e.g.  Klapp, 2005; Klapp & Hinkley, 
2002; Lleras & Enns, 2005; Mattler, 2006; Sumner, Tsai, Yu, & Nachev, 2006), and 
conversely, PCEs could occur with invisible primes (e.g. Lleras & Enns, 2006). It was 
also found that teaching subjects to discriminate the prime stimuli through extensive 
practice did not alter the NCE, which appears to rule out a causal relationship 
(Schlaghecken, Blagrove, & Maylor, 2008; we have replicated this in unpublished work).  
However, none of these results necessarily mean there is no relationship between 
visibility and the NCE. Learning to perform better on prime discrimination presumably 
relies on learning about the subtle clues present around the time of the onset of the 
mask. One way to do this would be to learn what to attend to. Such attentional learning 
might not transfer to make primes more visible in the masked priming blocks, because 
here the participant is instructed to ignore the primes and must pay attention to the 
target. Moreover, as outlined above, there does not need to be a causal role for visibility 
in reversed priming for us to expect a behavioural relationship between the two - it 
would emerge if common visual processing leads to visibility on the one hand and 
priming on the other. With regard to findings that in some experiments visible primes 
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can produce NCEs while in other experiments invisible primes can produce PCEs, this 
overturns a categorical distinction between invisible and visible primes, but it does not 
mean there is no relationship when other factors are held constant. Indeed, it is now 
generally accepted that there are at least two mechanisms that can contribute to NCEs, 
depending on the type of mask used (Boy, Clarke, & Sumner, 2008; Jaskowski, 2008; 
Klapp, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Sumner, 2008), and these may differ in their 
relationship to prime visibility. Overall, there are many indications in the literature that 
the more visible the prime, the more likely it is to produce a PCE, and conversely, NCEs 
are most easily produced with less visible or invisible primes (Klapp, 2005; Klapp & 
Hinkley, 2002; Lleras & Enns, 2004, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2006; Sumner et al., 
2006). However, like the counter-examples, these indications are not always free from 
other factors known to influence priming, such as differences in the mask. 
 
Experimental manipulation of prime visibility vs. individual differences 
Here we investigate two related questions: Firstly, is there a consistent relationship 
between average prime visibility, as measured by prime discrimination performance, and 
average priming effect when prime visibility is manipulated in different ways (prime 
contrast, prime-mask interval, mask contrast, mask density)? It is plausible that the 
relationship could depend on the way the stimuli are manipulated, because the different 
manipulations have different impacts on the initial visual burst of activity produced by 
the prime and the subsequent interaction of the prime activity and the mask activity. For 
example, if priming is primarily driven by the initial feed-forward sweep of prime activity, 
it may be more directly influenced by manipulating the contrast of the prime, than by 
manipulating the contrast of the mask, even though both affect prime visibility.  
Secondly, across participants, is there a systematic relationship between an 
individual’s priming effect and how well they can discriminate the prime? We would 
expect this to be the case if there is a causal relationship between visibility and priming, 
or if priming and visibility depend on the same perceptual representations, as discussed 
above. More generally, with the resurgence of interest in individual differences in 
perception and cognition, it seems to be a common assumption that established within-
subject phenomena will have easily interpreted translation to individual differences. But 
as discussed at the beginning of the Introduction, a correlation between priming and 
visibility across people does not necessarily follow from a relationship between average 
priming and average visibility produced by manipulating the stimuli (question 1).  
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Several previous studies have assumed a correlation in their methodology, because 
they have used a individual’s prime discrimination ability to set the ‘appropriate’ prime 
strength for that participant in priming blocks (e.g. Boy & Sumner, 2010). This approach 
appeared to 'work', but was never directly compared to using the same prime strength for 
all participants. In other experiments, both the presence (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; 
Klapp & Hinkley, 2002) and absence of a correlation has been reported (Hermens, 
Sumner, & Walker, 2010), but whenever the correlation has been measured with a single 
set of stimuli – i.e. with one particular prime strength – it could be misleading due to the 
biphasic nature of the priming effect. We will explain this in due course, along with the 
approach taken to overcome this problem, based on Eimer and Schlaghecken (2002). 
2. Methods 
 
Overview of experiments 
We present five new experiments and reanalyses of two previous ones, making seven 
sets of data with which to answer the two questions set out above. Experiments 1 and 2 
use prime duration and prime brightness, respectively, to manipulate visibility. The 
previous data sets, from Sumner et al. (2006), used the same manipulations but with 
fewer degrees of visibility, and thus represent replications of Experiments 1 and 2. For 
the logic of exposition they are therefore branded as Experiments 3 and 4. The original 
purpose of these previous experiments was to investigate the effect of attention on 
priming, but since the attention effect is not at stake here, we average over the attentional 
manipulation.  Experiments 5 and 6 manipulate the visibility of the prime by playing on 
the properties of the mask, modulating its brightness or its density, respectively. 
Experiment 7 manipulates prime brightness like Experiments 2 and 4, but implements a 
different way of determining prime visibility exactly following Eimer and Schlaghecken 
(2002). 
a. Participants (all experiments) 
62 participants (48 women; age 18–38) from Cardiff University participated in five 
experiments (respectively 11, 10, 10, 11 & 20 participants). Details about participants for 
Experiments 3 an 4 are to be found in Sumner et al. (2006). All self-reported having 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of brain damage and were right-
handed.  
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b. Apparatus (all experiments) 
Stimulus presentation was performed by a PC-controlled Cambridge Research Systems 
(CRS) Visage® connected to a 21” Sony GDM-F520 Trinitron monitor. Stimulus 
presentation was synchronized with the screen refresh rate of 100 Hz, and timings were 
controlled and measured by the CRS clock and thus not subject to the errors produced 
by normal PC operating systems. Manual responses were collected using a CRS-CB6 
button box.  
c.  Masked-priming task 
The protocol is given in full for Experiment 1, and deviations from this in the other 
experiments are detailed below. Participants made speeded responses with a left- or 
right-hand key press (counterbalanced) to right and left arrows (1° x 1.5°), which 
occurred in random order and located at 0.5º from fixation, in a random direction from 
fixation (see Fig. 2-B). A ﬁxation cross was visible at the center of the screen at the 
beginning of each trial. The primes were identical to either one or the other target, but 
presented for various duration between 10 and 60 ms (by steps of 10 ms), and appeared 
within 0.5° of fixation (i.e., in the same vicinity as the target, but not in an identical 
location on any trial). In all conditions the prime was followed by a 100 ms mask of 2.2° 
x 2.2° and constructed of 36 randomly orientated lines, excluding any orientation closer 
than ± 5° to the orientations present in the prime and target stimuli. A new mask was 
constructed on each trial but appeared always in the same place, centred on fixation. All 
trials had a long mask-target SOA of 150 ms. The background was dark grey (10 cdm-2) 
and other stimuli were light grey: fixation cross, primes, targets and masks were 60 
cd/m2. 480 trials were presented in a random order (60 trials for each prime duration), 
with brief breaks every 60 trials. Participants were not informed about the different 
prime durations. Stimulus sequence illustrated in Fig 2-B.  
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Figure 2:  A) Illustration of the stimulus sequence in the prime detection tasks. (B) Illustration 
of the stimulus sequence in the masked-priming tasks. C) Illustration of the four ways to alter 
prime visibility, with primes getting stronger or masks getting weaker from top to bottom. 
Because prime visibility is changed through the modulation of the physical characteristics of 
the prime or the mask, we will refer to changes in the prime ‘strength’. 
 
d. Prime identification tasks 
In experiments 1 to 6, prime visibility thresholds were assessed individually before or 
after each masked-priming task using a procedure of constant stimuli (240 trials in total, 
testing each of the prime or mask conditions in randomized order). The participants’ task 
was to guess the identity of the prime (forced choice). For each experiment, stimulus 
sequence and timing was identical to the masked priming protocol, but with the target 
omitted (Fig 2-A). In Experiment 7 instead of using a method of constant stimuli to 
assess prime visibility, we used a 2-up 1-down staircase procedure following Eimer and 
Schlaghecken (2002). The staircase continued until four consecutive staircase reversals 
and data from the staircase were then used to plot the individual’s prime visibility 
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psychometric function.  Discussion of the procedure (particularly why our procedure 
does not contain the target stimulus) can be found in a previous publication (Boy & 
Sumner, 2010). 
e. Experiment 2  
The procedure was identical to Exp. 1 except that we fixed the duration of the prime at 
40 ms and manipulated its brightness to cross the perceptual threshold. Six levels of 
brightness were selected (20, 40, 60, 80, 120 & 160 cd/m2) and picked in a randomly 
shuffled order on each trial (see Fig 2-B).    
f.  Experiments 3 & 4 
The datasets termed experiment 3 and 4 are re-analyses of the data collected by Sumner 
et al. (2006). As their dataset also contained an attentional cue manipulation that is not of 
interest for the present purpose, we collapsed the validly and invalidly cued conditions. 
Experiment 3 reanalyzes the data in their second experiment for primes lasting 20, 30, 
40, 50 and 60 ms. Experiment 4 reanalyzes their third experiment in which they used 4 
levels of prime brightness (20, 40, 80 & 160 cd/m2). Note that in both these experiments, 
presentation was blocked (256 trials for each prime duration or each prime brightness), 
rather than randomly shuffled, as in Experiments 1 and 2 above. 
g. Experiments 5 & 6 
In these experiments, prime duration was fixed at 40 ms and the manipulation affected 
the brightness of the mask (values between 20 & 160 cd/m2) or its density (mask 
composed of 2, 4, 9, 16, 25, 36 lines, at random in any of the grid positions, see Figure 2-
B). On each trial, one of the six levels of mask brightness (Expt. 5) or mask density 
(Expt. 6) was selected in a randomly shuffled order (a total of 80 trials for each of the 6 
levels of brightness or density). Other details are as in Expt 1. 
h. Experiment 7 
 
The masked-priming task in Experiment 7 was identical to Experiment 2 where prime 
brightness was manipulated (in 6 levels, 20, 60, 60, 80, 120 & 160 cd/m2). The difference 
resides in the prime identification task, which utilized a staircase procedure (see above). 
We also ran more participants. 
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3. Results 
a. Average compatibility effects  
For average compatibility effect (CE, average reaction time to incompatible trials - 
average reaction time to compatible trials), the results are unambiguous and simply 
stated. We find a clear transition from negative CEs for weak primes to positive CEs for 
stronger primes in all experiments (all Fs > 15, all ps < .0001, see Fig 3). The pattern is 
independent of the way prime strength was manipulated. Since visibility (prime 
discrimination) also rises systematically with these manipulations of the stimuli, strong 
correlations occur in each experiment between CEs and prime discrimination for each 
stimulus condition for each participant (all rs > .56, ps < .001; see Fig 4). However, as we 
shall see below, these correlations are entirely driven by the manipulation of stimulus 
strength, and not at all by individual differences in discrimination ability.   
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Figure 3. (A:G): Average compatibility effect as a function of mean prime visibility for each 
level of prime visibility for all seven experiments (error bars represent the inter-individual 
standard error of the mean). A spline fit connects the data points (we have no theoretical 
basis for any particular curve fit). As in Eimer and Schlaghecken (2002), the dotted vertical 
line on each plot indicates the 66% prime discrimination threshold along the prime visibility 
gradient as determined in the prime identification tasks. 
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Figure 4. (A:G): Scatter plots of the compatibility effect against prime discrimination. The 
coefficient of correlation of the linear regression is presented (along with its p-value). 
 
b. Correlations between priming and visibility across individuals 
Approach:  If priming is zero with no prime, negative with an intermediate strength 
prime and positive with a strong prime, there are two places in this relationship where it 
is weakly negative: with very weak primes, or with stronger primes that are not quite 
strong enough to produce positive priming. Measuring the simple correlation between 
discrimination and priming could therefore be misleading, because subjects showing the 
same level of priming could actually be at different points on the biphasic relationship 
between prime strength and priming effect. To get around this problem, we followed 
Eimer and Schlaghecken (2002) and took the approach of measuring both discrimination 
and priming effect for multiple prime strengths. Then, for each participant, the 
discrimination threshold was extracted from the psychometric function of discrimination 
performance against prime strength, and the priming transition point (negative to 
positive) was extracted from the curve of CE against prime strength (see Fig 5). In other 
words, for each individual, we found the prime strength for which discrimination 
accuracy was 75%, and the prime strength for which negative priming turned to positive 
priming (the zero crossing). If prime visibility is related to priming, these two measures 
are expected to positively correlate.  
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Figure 5.  Illustration of the data processing chain used for testing correlation between 
individuals’ priming effect and how well they see the primes. A) Prime discrimination: 
derivation of the prime strength at which each subject shows 75% discrimination of the 
prime stimuli (which corresponds to guessing in 50% of trials). B) Masked priming: derivation 
of the prime strength for which each subject’s compatibility effect goes from negative to 
positive. C) Correlation between these two measures.  
 
 
In seven experiments we found only one hint of a positive correlation (Experiment 1, r 
= .28, p= .38). In all six other experiments, correlations coefficients ranged from -.21 to -
.07 (all ps = NS, Fig 6). Of course, null results are difficult to be sure of. One possibility, 
especially with relatively small N, is that one or two outlying values can destroy the 
statistical correlation even though a true correlation might exist. To assess the likelihood 
of this, we used jackknife estimates, which, reassuringly showed that none of the 
correlation coefficients are likely to be affected by a large bias; on average, the “true” 
coefficient of correlation was probably misestimated by not more than ± 0.09 (Table 1, 
row 2).  
 
Another possibility is that it is possible that any given subsample of a population, by 
chance, will not show a correlation even though a correlation exists in the whole 
population. We used simulation to estimate the chance of this happening in all seven 
experiments for the N we used in each experiment. Only one experiment in a total of 
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seven found a numerically positive r-value (but statistically not significant). Thus we 
estimated the chance that despite there existing a real between-subject correlation 
between visibility and priming, we only obtained once a positive r-value in all seven 
experiments. To do this we assume that despite any noise in our variable measures, if we 
had measured a sufficiently large number of participants we would have revealed a 
correlation if it exists. For exposition, let us assume it would be r=0.3. We therefore 
simulate a large population (100 000 data points) with a correlation of r=0.3. We then 
simulate each experiment by randomly selecting the same number of points as we had 
participants in that experiment, and we calculate the r-value we obtain with this 
subsample. We repeat this for each of the seven experiments, and then count the number 
of positive and negative r values obtained. We repeat this procedure 100 000 times, to 
obtain the probability that only one (or less) of our seven experiments would give an r 
value above zero, if the real r value is, for example, 0.3.  
 
We repeated this for ‘real’ r-values from 0 to 1. For 'real' r-values of 0.4 and above, the 
simulation produced zero occurrences of our data pattern in 100 000 iterations. For a 
real value of r=0.3 there were 16/100000, for a real value of r=0.2 there were 
174/100000, for r=0.1 there were 1352/100000, and for r=0 there were 5914/100000. 
In other words, the probability of getting our results for a real r>0.3 is very low, and the 
probability for a real r=0.2 is about 30 times (5914/174) lower than if the real r-value is 
zero (for real r=0.1 it is about 4-5 times lower than for no correlation). From this we 
conclude that the likelihood of there being any sizable correlation (r>0.2) between 
visibility and priming is very small, given our data. 
 
 
We also checked whether the results were specific to extracting discrimination threshold 
using 75% performance. They were not; using either a 66% or a 70% threshold also 
produced no hint of positive correlation for experiment 2 to 7 (-0.18< r < 0.09). r-value 
for experiment 1 stayed close to the estimate at 75% performance (respectively .24 and 
.27). This is important because participants can differ in the slope as well as the position 
of their psychometric functions, and thus their rank order can change if we use different 
criteria for what their conscious threshold is. Note that at 75% discrimination accuracy, 
participants are 'seeing' (or basing their answers on information) 50% of the time, since 
that pure guessing would produce 25% correct answers when there are 25% incorrect 
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answers. At 66% accuracy, they are 'seeing' the stimulus 32% of the time (100-34*2). 
Thus the range of visibility levels we have used for the analysis spans 32%-50% seen 
targets, which we believe appropriately reflects the transition from subliminal to 
supraliminal. Note that the NCE to PCE transitions are also in this region (Figure 3). In 
case the correlation is better reflected by visibility performance near chance levels for the 
very weakest primes, we also correlated the earliest points on the psychometric functions 
(where they cross the y-axis) with the CE transition points. Of the seven experiments, we 
only obtained hints of positive correlation for experiments 1 and 7 (respectively .34 and 
.23, ps= NS). Finally we performed a further analysis that does not rely on estimating 
correlations at all (see section c). 
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Figure 6. (A:G): Individual data for the six experiments. Column 1: Prime strength at 75 % 
detection thresholds in the prime detection task. Column 2: Prime strength at the Zero-CE. 
Column 3:  Scatter plot of detection threshold against priming transition point. The red 
arrows in row A show examples of how these values are derived (also refer to Figure 5).   
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Table 1.  Rows 1 & 2: Pearson’s coefficients of correlation and their Jackknife bias estimates 
for the seven experiments.  Rows 3 & 4: Results of the Fisher’s Z-score difference test 
comparing correlations obtained in the seven experiments to that calculated for Eimer and 
Schlaghecken’s (2002) datasets. Row 5: P-values derived from bootstrapping approach. See 
sections b and d of results for details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Better and worse discriminators. 
As a further analysis to test whether there is any effect of discrimination ability on 
priming, we plotted average CE curves for two groups of participants in each experiment 
– those with above median discrimination scores, and those with below median scores 
(we did this based on the individual 66% threshold values). Although this approach is 
more blunt than approaches taken above, it has two advantages: it includes all the 
participants, whereas above we could not include participants if their CE curve did not 
cross from negative to positive; it presents a clear visualization of whether the priming 
curve depends on prime visibility without the need for a further, less intuitive, analysis 
step (see Figure 7). We found no hint of any effect of visibility on the CE curves. 
 
 Expt. 
1 
Expt. 
2 
Expt. 
3 
Expt. 
4 
Expt. 
5 
Expt. 
6 
Expt. 
7 
Pearson’s r .245 -.1061 -.105 -.0616 -.2167 -.1605 -.1671 
Jackknife bias est. -0.002 -0.003 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.015 
Z-score difference to Eimer & 
Schlaghecken 
0.26 2.07 2.06 1.97 2.43 2.30 2.35 
p-value .441 .047 .048 .057 .021 .029 0.024 
Boot-strap p-value .104 .037 .031 .042 .0056 .029 0.021 
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Figure 7. (A:G): Average CE curves for participant demonstrating best and worse 
discrimination in each experiment – those with above median discrimination scores, (red – 
labeled “Best”) and those with below median scores (blue – labeled “Worse”) ) A spline fit 
connects the data points (we have no theoretical basis for any particular curve fit). If the 
priming effect became positive only as an individual was better able to discriminate the 
prime, we would expect the blue curve to be shifted to the right relative to the red curve, 
because worse discriminators would need more powerful primes (relative to the mask) to 
produce positive priming. This is clearly not the case. 
d. Direct comparison to Eimer & Schlaghecken (2002) 
Eimer & Schlaghecken (2002) used the same framework as we have done, but unlike us, 
they found positive correlations between discrimination threshold and CE crossing point 
in two experiments, which manipulated prime strength using prime duration and mask 
density. To make a direct comparison with our data, we pooled together data from the 
two experiments by Eimer & Schlaghecken (2002) by Z-scoring them and obtained a 
correlation of r = .67 (p< .0007) for this new combined set of data. We also transformed 
the r-values from our experiments into Z-scores (through the r-to-z transformation 
method defined in Fisher, 1915): In five out of seven experiments, our correlation 
differed significantly from that of Eimer and Schlaghecken (see Table 1, 3rd & 4th row).  
Further, because there is possible bias in this parametric comparison introduced by 
distribution distortion in small samples, we    used a data-driven bootstrapping approach. 
We derived a distribution or r-values for each experiment (and for the combined data in 
Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2002) by resampling the data (with replacement) 10000 times. 
The overlapping area under any two distributions then gives the p-value for the null 
hypothesis that the two r-values do not differ. These are given in Table 1, 5th row, for the 
comparisons of each of our experiments with the combined data of Eimer and 
Schlaghecken’s two experiments. In Experiments 1-6 we used a method of constant 
  20 
stimuli to provide the psychometric function for estimating prime visibility. Eimer & 
Schlaghecken (2002) used a staircase procedure. In case this might make a difference to 
participant's behaviour, Experiment 7 used a staircase procedure. The results were 
indistinguishable from Experiments 2-6, and significantly different to Eimer & 
Schlaghecken (2002) (see Table 1) suggesting that the exact method of assessing visibility 
is not responsible for our failure to find a correlation. 
 
4. Discussion 
Our results lead both to specific conclusions about the disputed relationship between 
visibility and reversed masked priming, and also more general conclusions about how 
relationships that are clearly apparent across stimulus manipulations can be entirely 
absent across individual differences. The latter issue is of general interest for the growing 
use of cognitive and sensorimotor tasks to study individual differences. 
 
Implications for the study of individual differences.  
Despite the theoretical problems, outlined in the Introduction, of relating individual 
differences to experimental manipulations (e.g. Borsboom, 2006), in practice there are 
many examples of cognitive tasks that were developed within the sphere of within-
subject designs being widely employed in the study of individual differences. This trend 
is increasing with the rise of genetics and the search for cognitive endophenotypes of 
psychiatric disorders, for early markers of dementia/cognitive impairment, and the 
development of ever more sophisticated brain imaging techniques that are analyzed at 
the individual level, rather than using group-averages (voxel-based morphometry, 
diffusion tensor imaging, magnetic resonance spectroscopy, dynamic causal modeling 
etc.) With respect to these growing fields, our results can be taken as an exemplar 
cautionary tale: even relationships between simple tasks and basic cognitive constructs 
that are well worked out in the realm of controlled stimulus manipulations and within-
subject designs, may not transfer to individual differences. Just as has been statistically 
pointed out (e.g. Borsboom, 2006, Borsboom et al, 2009), and as illustrated in Figure 1, 
the inter-individual variance can have an entirely different source from that produced by 
stimulus manipulations. 
The problem is likely to arise due to the multiple factors contributing to individual 
differences, even in simple tasks. For example, various ‘inhibition’ tasks have been 
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employed to study self-control and impulsivity, such as the antisaccade, Stroop task or 
stop-signal task. For these tasks, it is generally assumed that individual differences in 
performance reflect basic differences in inhibition ability, but this simple conclusion is 
actually not well supported by the fact that performance tends to correlate only very 
poorly across tasks supposed to measure the same inhibition ability (Barch, Braver, 
Carter, Poldrack, & Robbins, 2009; Cothran & Larsen, 2008; Cyders & Coskunpinar, 
2011; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Schachar, 2011). Thus just like in complex traits such as 
IQ and personality, individual differences in relatively simple behavioural tasks may also 
be too multiply determined to be easily matched to the cognitive mechanisms revealed by 
experimental manipulation. 
This is not to say that there is no point attempting to relate individual differences in 
cognition to the mechanisms explored through experimental manipulations. Rather, we 
argue that the endeavor will be more fruitful if approached with the understanding that 
the relationship will be complex and tricky to work out, rather than the assumption that 
individual differences automatically reflect the same mechanisms studied by within-
subject manipulations in the same task. We recognise that this implicit assumption is very 
hard to avoid, and we have made it ourselves previously. Even Borsboom et al (2009) in 
their excellent exposition of the statistical problem of relating inter- and intra-individual 
variance, appear to conflate between and within participant effects at one point (p. 24-26, 
a study of differences in chess playing between expert and non-expert groups is used to 
support a conclusion about gaining expertise within individuals).  
That even the best statisticians succumb occasionally appears to confirm the deeply 
intuitive and appealing nature of such conclusions - which may sometimes be correct. 
But given their intuitiveness, the upmost vigilance will be required to work out when 
such assumptions are unfounded. This can be supported by the adoption, where 
appropriate, of statistical techniques that allow within and between participant variance 
to be analysed simultaneously (e.g. multilevel modeling, nested design, see Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012; Kliegl et al, 2011).  
Furthermore, different sources of inter- and intra- individual variance can be 
exploited to form more stringent tests of theory. For example, if X is hypothesized to 
cause Y, then there should be a systematic relationship between X and Y both in intra- 
and inter- individual variance. If both variances are assumed to come from the same 
source this might be seen merely as a replication, which would not encourage researchers 
to assess both. 
  22 
 
The relationship between prime visibility and the NCE. 
The role of visibility for the ‘inhibitory’ component of masked priming – the NCE – 
has been disputed for a decade (for reviews, see Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; Sumner, 
2007).  In essence, there have been two questions at stake: Firstly, whether there is any 
systematic relationship between prime strength / visibility and the direction of priming; 
secondly, whether there is a causal connection between awareness and the occurrence or 
not of motor inhibition.  Initial studies found that primes presented below the threshold 
of conscious visibility were categorically associated with NCEs whereas visible primes 
were associated with PCEs (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002).  
Other studies implied that the transition from NCE to PCE seemed to occur in a 
continuous manner: as the prime got more visible, priming got more positive (Klapp, 
2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2006; Sumner et al., 2006). However some studies found – 
and some authors strongly argued for – no association between prime visibility and the 
direction of priming (Jaskowski, Bialunska, & Verleger, 2007; Lleras & Enns, 2004; 
Verleger, Jaskowski, Aydemir, van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004). There have often been 
difficulties of interpretation because prime visibility is normally confounded with 
changes to the stimuli – such as the masks – which are thought to have their own effects 
on priming (Jaskowski, 2008; Jaskowski et al., 2007; Lleras & Enns, 2004; Verleger et al., 
2004) and conversely, studies aiming to investigate different masks have often been 
confounded by visibility differences. Schlaghecken et al. (2008) circumvented this 
problem by changing prime discrimination through perceptual learning without changing 
the stimulus. Improved prime discrimination ('visibility') did not correspond to any 
change in the priming effect, providing the strongest evidence yet against a causal role 
for visibility. However, it remained possible that discrimination had improved through 
participants learning to attend better to the small cues available to guide prime 
discrimination. Such learning might not have transferred to masked priming blocks 
because participants now had to ignore the primes and attend to the target. 
 
Our approach was to test whether any relationship consistently held across different 
types of stimulus manipulation, and across individual ability. We found a clear systematic 
relationship between visibility (prime strength/mask weakness) and the direction of 
priming in every dataset (Fig 3, 4, 7). Since this held for four different ways to manipulate 
visibility (prime duration, prime brightness, mask brightness and mask density), it is 
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unlikely simply to reflect one type of stimulus characteristic. It appears to be a more 
general product of the relative strengths of prime and mask. Thus in answer to the first 
question - is there a systematic relationship? - we conclude that under most types of 
prime or mask manipulations, there is a strong relationship between prime visibility and 
priming. 
 
To further test the causal hypothesis, we took advantage of an alternative source of 
variance in visibility – individual differences. As in the perceptual learning approach of 
Schlaghecken et al. (2008), this is also not confounded by stimulus changes. Here we 
found, across all seven datasets, no hint of any positive correlation between priming and 
an individual’s ability to discriminate the primes (Fig 6 & 7), supporting the conclusions 
of Schlaghecken et al. (2008) that there is no causal influence. We used converging 
approaches to ascertain whether this was simply due to lack of power or outliers in the 
data (jackknifing, simulation, bootstrapping, direct comparisons to the previous study of 
Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2002, and grouping the CE data by a median split of the 
discrimination data, Fig 7). We cannot explain why our results do differ from those of 
Eimer and Schlaghecken (though we speculate below), but we can appeal to weight of 
evidence (seven datasets here, plus the evidence from Schlaghecken et al., 2008, vs. two 
experiments in Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2002). Further, it is essential to note that the 
logic that our framework for understanding the data, spelled out in the following 
sections, does not disallow correlations to occur – indeed we have shown they clearly 
occur for within-subject stimulus manipulation – they just do not reflect direct causal 
linkage when they do.  
 
Implications for theories of the NCE 
Our results are inconsistent with the original theory of the NCE (Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002), because it contained a causal role for prime 
visibility, proposing that automatic motor inhibition occurred as a result of the initial 
prime-related motor activation failing to reach awareness. The results are consistent with 
two later theories, which both emphasize the importance of the mask stimulus, but do 
not envisage a causal connection between prime visibility and the NCE. 
The ‘object updating’ (or ‘active mask’, or ‘mask-induced priming’, Lleras & Enns, 
2004, 2005; Verleger et al., 2004) account suggested that the NCE was caused not by 
motor inhibition, but by positive priming in an unexpected direction due to prime-mask 
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interaction. When the mask contains elements of both possible primes, then the prime-
mask sequence can also be considered as a sequence of both primes presented overlaid 
with a brief temporal separation. The ‘prime’ that appears second (i.e. the new elements 
of the mask) could then reverse any priming associated with the prime that appeared first 
(i.e. the actual ‘prime’). In this case, either increasing the perceptual strength of the first 
prime, or decreasing the perceptual strength of the second prime (our mask 
manipulations) would be expected to increasingly favour positive priming over reversed 
priming, creating the systematic relationship we found. However, previous studies have 
shown that the object updating account is very unlikely to explain the NCE with the type 
of mask stimuli we employ, which are not made up of overlapping prime stimuli 
(Sumner, 2007). Therefore, we turn to the second mask-related theory. 
The mask-triggered inhibition account (Boy et al., 2008; Jaskowski et al., 2007) shared 
the element of automatic motor inhibition with the original theory of Eimer and 
Schlaghecken, but it also focused on the mask like the object updating / active mask 
theory (Lleras & Enns, 2004, 2005; Verleger et al., 2004). It proposed that the inhibition 
must be triggered by a second stimulus that occurs after the prime – in this case the 
mask. New behaviorally relevant stimulus onsets are proposed to elicit inhibition of 
motor activity associated with previous stimulus – an automatic version of the bridge 
telling the engine room ‘hold that last command, new information received…’ In this 
case, it is clear that weaker masks might progressively weaken the triggered inhibition, 
and thus make an NCE less likely.  
Why stronger primes should also make the NCE less likely requires a bit more 
discussion, since the NCE has been found to strongly mirror the positive priming effect 
measured at shorter prime-target intervals (Boy & Sumner, 2010). We might therefore 
expect that stronger primes would lead to stronger positive priming and also stronger 
inhibition. That this is not the case implies that the inhibition mechanism may be limited 
in strength, and once the initial positive deflection of motor activation becomes too 
strong, it cannot be fully reversed. This explanation is consistent with the arguments of 
Lingnau and Vorberg (2005), who pointed out that the occurrence of a PCE does not 
mean inhibition is absent – just that inhibition was insufficient to reverse the initial 
activity. After all, it is plausible that the functional role of such inhibition would not be to 
reverse the direction of motor balance, but to return it towards baseline. It may be that 
only within a tight range of parameters in an artificial laboratory situation do we find that 
the elicited inhibition over-compensates for the initial activation, creating the NCE. Note 
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that for the sake of clarity, we have chosen to speak simply in terms of the relative strength 
of inhibition and activation mechanisms; we could also envisage that manipulations of 
the prime and mask differentially affect their response profiles across time. 
 
Implications for dissociation of visibility and sensori-motor mechanisms 
The lack of correlation across subjects, accompanied by the clear relationship across 
stimulus manipulation, allows us to go further than simply selecting a theory of the NCE 
that does not require causal connection between visibility and the NCE. Even the mask-
triggered inhibition account (and the object updating account) would, at first sight, 
predict that if the relationship is present across stimulus manipulation, we would expect 
it across participants too. A participant who shows greater prime discrimination ability 
presumably has, in some way, a stronger representation of the prime relative to the mask 
than a participant who cannot discriminate the prime with the same stimulus settings. In 
other words, we assume that the direction of priming is caused by the relative strengths 
of activation and inhibition processes, which are in turn related to the relative strengths 
of prime and mask signals in the visual system. If we further assume that prime 
discrimination performance also reflects the relative strength of prime and mask signals 
in that person’s visual system, then we should find the correlation between visibility and 
priming across participants as well as across stimulus manipulations (Fig 8-A). That we 
do not, tells us that inter-subject variance in discrimination must arise mainly from a 
difference source than inter-stimulus variance in discrimination.  
The simplest solution to this would be that visibility and priming rely on entirely 
separate processes in different brain regions, that share only some initial early visual stage 
(Fig 8-B). Such conception of separate routes to process different aspects of a stimulus 
are not uncommon in psychology and echoes the famous dissociation between the 
processing of visual information for perception or for action (Milner & Goodale, 1995). 
If stimulus manipulations affect the shared visual stages, that would cause the 
relationship we reliably found. If inter-subject variabilities in visibility and priming arise 
mainly not in the early visual mechanisms, but in the further processes supporting 
awareness or motor processes separately, then there would be no correlation just as we 
found.  
We speculate that the main locus of individual variation is not fixed, and will depend 
on study parameters and the idiosyncrasies of participants. If in some studies a 
substantial portion of inter-individual variance happens to arise from the shared visual 
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stages, a correlation will be found between visibility and priming, just as reported by 
Eimer and Schlaghecken (2002). 
Anatomical separation is not required, however, to explain our results, and neither is 
a view that some visual processes are ‘for’ perception while others are ‘for’ action.  We 
believe that all vision and perception is, in some sense, for action, but there are different 
degrees of temporal immediacy between visual and motor mechanisms (Bompas and 
Sumner, 2008). For example, the temporal distinction between a feed-forward sweep and 
a subsequent phase of recurrent processing (e.g., Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) could also 
provide our dissociation between stimulus manipulations and cross-participant 
correlation. Rapid motor priming and inhibition are presumably triggered by the 
feedforward sweep, while conscious perception is thought to rely on recurrent 
processing (Fig 8-B). Indeed, this is the main explanation for how subliminal priming is 
possible at all. Individual differences in recurrent processing need not correlate with 
individual differences in the feedforward sensorimotor sweep, leading to no correlation 
between visibility and priming. However, if stimuli are manipulated, then both 
feedforward and recurrent phases are necessarily affected, and hence a systematic 
relationship between visibility and priming occurs. 
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Figure 8: A) Even without direct causal influence of visibility on priming, if the ability to 
identify the prime and the level of positive or reversed priming arise from the strength of 
representations in the same cascaded processing pathway, a correlation is expected. 
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However, B) if the processes are separate, either anatomically or temporally, no correlation 
between them is expected. 
 
A final twist in the tale/tail of the relationship 
 There is a final complication in the relationship between prime strength and the 
NCE, which recent evidence suggests is in fact consistent with the conclusions of this 
paper. When masked primes have been presented in the periphery, or when primes at 
fixation have been degraded, a PCE, not an NCE has occurred (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 
2000, 2002, 2006). In other words, not only do strong primes produce PCEs, so do very 
weak primes (at least under some circumstances), and NCEs occur only for a band in 
between. To explain this, Schlaghecken & Eimer (2002) invoked a threshold mechanism 
by which inhibition is not triggered unless the initial prime-related activation is 
sufficiently strong (though still sub-motor threshold). Lingnau & Vorberg (2005) put this 
issue to test and systematically varied prime eccentricity, prime size and mask-target 
SOA, and argued that rather than a threshold below which inhibition does not occur, 
primes that leave weaker, smaller cortical representation could simply produce weaker 
inhibition with slower time course.  
 Interestingly, none of our seven datasets showed any hint of this PCE for the 
weakest primes. It is possible that none of our primes were weak enough, relative to the 
masks and targets we used. Additionally, it is likely that there is not a simple weakness 
metric for primes that differ on various dimensions. Although all our manipulations here 
behaved in effectively the same way with respect to the peri-threshold NCE-to-PCE 
transition, it remains possible that the PCE seen previously for very weak primes does 
not occur for all ways of making a prime weak. Previously, the PCE for weak central 
primes with around 150 ms mask-target SOA (as we had here) was produced by adding 
noise to very brief primes (Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2002). None of our manipulations 
emulated this procedure, and most of our primes were 40 ms long. When primes were 
shorter than this, they were high contrast and none were presented in the context of 
noise. Just as we find here that prime visibility does not straightforwardly predict the 
transition from NCE to PCE for stronger primes, a simple 'perceptual weakness' metric 
may not predict whether weak primes produce a PCE or not. 
 
Consistent with this, Budnik, Bompas & Sumner (2013) recently reported that even 
when equated for visibility, peripheral and central primes still produced opposite priming 
effects. This indicates that there is no simple metric of perceptual strength between fovea 
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and periphery that both predicts priming and is reflected by discrimination performance. 
Rather, there seems to be a distinction between a prime's ability to reach conscious 
awareness (which Budnik et al. (2013) called 'perceptual strength') and its ability to elicit 
motor activation and inhibition (which Budnik et al. (2013) called 'sensorimotor 
strength'). Such a distinction is fully consistent with Figure 8-B, and our finding that 
individuals' ability to see primes does not predict their priming effects. 
 
Conclusions 
We have found a reliable systematic relationship between prime visibility and the 
direction of priming when stimulus properties of prime or mask are manipulated, but we 
have also shown that this was accompanied by a consistent lack of correlation across 
participants. We conclude that the relationship across stimulus manipulation occurs due 
to the relative impacts of prime and mask signals on motor activation and inhibition, 
consistent with the mask-triggered inhibition account of the NCE. Individual variance in 
discrimination ability must arise from a different source, probably the recurrent processes 
that support awareness. In a more general context, the clear coexistence of correlation 
across stimuli, but not across people – and thus the fact that the respective variances 
must arise from different sources – has cautionary implications for the interpretation of 
even relatively simple cognitive tasks in the study of individual differences.  
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